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Stabilization Policy and Monetary
Equilibrium
Sourcesof Inflationary Pressure
OVERthe years, Soviet economic policy has had to deal with a
wide range of macroeconomic problems, some of which are
similar to those encountered in Western economies. Repressed
inflation is one of these, arising from excessive money creation.'
The opening of an inflationary gap in the consumer sector may
be due to one or several of the following main causes: faulty
planning, crop failures, bottlenecks in the flow of materials into
consumergoodsindustries,excessiveimmobilizationof
resources in unfinished investment projects, transportation diffi-
culties, and insufficient or defective storage facilities. Such phe-
nomena unbalance the equilibrium between the flow of purchas-
ing power to consumers and the availability of goods provided for
in the economic plan. The concentration on goods was justified
until recent years because the flow of purchasable services to
consumers was very small.
Students from noncommunist countries have been almost
exclusively interested in the effect of inflation on the real wages of
urban wage earners. Yet, until 1960 the rural population was
larger than the urban population, and twenty years earlier it had
been twice as large.2 Another source of inflationary pressures is
the excessive immobilization of resources in unfinished major
'The term "inflation" is banned from the Soviet vocabulary in relation to the domestic
economy.
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capital investment projects.3 During World War II, another major
problem was the accumulation of money in the hands of the
agricultural population. This was the unavoidable consequence of
several factors: the efforts to achieve maximum availability of
farm products in the face of a huge manpower drain; the almost
total lack of industrially produced inputs in agriculture, and the
general disorganization as the invading armies swept back and
forth across the main producing areas of the country.
In the enterprise sector, fixed transfer and end-product prices
for producers' and consumer goods, together with the attached
administrative controls, have sharply limited the ability of man-
agers to use enterprise balances outside of the legitimate planned
channels.4 Lower-echelon administrative units can obtain funds
mainly via the national budget; other sources are marginal.
The fact that the unified budget has always been in balance or
shown a surplus (except for one or two war years) eliminates a
possible source of inflationary financing which is significant in
some nonsocialist countries. However, enough outside pressures
from industrial ministries, glavks, and various federal and repub-
lican authorities converge on the State Bank to result; at times, in
excessive credit issuance, prolongation and renewal (if necessary,
in disguised form) of loans outstanding, and undesirable over-
expansion of currency in circulation.5
Policy Objectives
The objectives of Soviet financial policy are essentially twofold:
to achieve macro equilibrium in the enterprise sector by securing
adequate financing to cover the planned volume of investment,
3See Brzeski [222).
4The Soviet government has not used the various techniques developed in other socialist
countries to deal with excess liquidity. Such techniques include the temporary blocking of
some part of enterprise accounts (Poland), creation of credit cooperatives in which some
part of money held by farmers is immobilized as the members' capital contribution (China),
and advance deposits (usually in special savings bank accounts) for cars (Czechoslovalda),
cooperative apartments, or imports.
'This contrasts with the experience of other socialist countries of Eastern Europe,
where overspending by state enterprises and operations of the remaining private enterprise
sector have occasionally constituted important sources of inflationary pressures. See, for
instance, Podolski [139].158 Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium
and to avoid—and, if necessary, absorb—any excess purchasing
power in the household sector.
In the enterprise sector, "financial balance" is achieved when
budget resources available for investment plus retained enterprise
profits earmarked for this purpose match planned investment
requirementsinexcess of availabledepreciationreserves.
Equilibria consistent with quite different allocations of resources
and rates of growth may be achieved at various levels by successful
manipulation of taxes, prices, and credit.
In the household sector, the main objectives of financial policy
are to avoid inflationary pressures, both overt and repressed, in
the consumer goods market and to prevent consumers from
becoming excessively liquid. This must be viewed against the
background of the inelastic supply of consumer goods resulting
from the forced-draft industrialization since the inauguration of
the first Five-Year Plan in 1928. Since the early thirties, banking
policy has aimed at preventing loan expansion from raising cur-
rency withdrawals above the total value of any additional con-
sumer goods and services the economy is capable of producing.
While overall economic strategy at different times has involved
the use of available policy tools in a variety of combinations,
Soviet sources (official as well as academic) hardly ever discuss
its rationale and actual applicatioti.
The Tools
In order to achieve policy objectives, the main reliance is placed
on the monobank-monobudget system which was created in the
early thirties and was a pioneering move by the first socialist
country to provide an optimal financial structure for stimulating
planned economic growth under conditions of reasonable mone-
tary equilibrium. The various methods that have been used by the
Soviet Union to achieve macro equilibrium can be classified into
categories corresponding to those common in the noncommunist
countries: monetary, fiscal, and income policies. The first
includes credit planning and regulation of currency circulation.
The second consists essentially of variations in planned budget
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ess purchasing tax rates (mostly the turnover tax on individual products). The
third, income policy, involves, in the broadestsense, determina-
achieved when tion of the share of the national product earmarked for household
med enterprise consumption, with administrative changes in wage policy and
ed investment allocation of resources and, if necessary, mid-stream adjustments
tionreserves, in five-year plan targets.
is of resources The above classification of economic policies is subject to the
s by successful qualification that many aspects of fiscal policy have, in fact,
significant monetary aspects, while others, such as the manipula-
financial policy tion of the turnover tax on individual products, arean important
I repressed, in element in price formation and, therefore, in income policy.
nsumers from Policies pursued to cope with chronic shortages of consumer
ed against the goods have included efforts to increase the flow of such goods
resulting above the quantities originally planned by "overfulfilling" the
nauguration of plan, to adjust the composition of indUstrial output between
lirties, banking producers' and consumer goods, and to change the "assortment"
)m raising cur- of products available to households. Since the mid-fifties,mea-
Idditional COfl sures to increase the supply of consumer goods to relieve inflation-
producing. ary pressures have also included limited encouragement of pri-
has involved vate production by members of kolkhozes, fuller use of by-
combinations, products and industrial remnants in consumer goods production,6
Ly ever discuss and allocating an increasing share of foreign exchange earnings
for consumer goods imports (primarily from other socialist
countries).
MONETARY POLICY
iance is placed Even though in the Soviet economy money is reduced to the
created in the function of "numeraire" and isolated from influences of the
first socialist balance of payments as well as from fluctuations in domestic gold
for stimulating production, it is nevertheless a necessary ingredient of a centrally
sonable mone- controlled (or administrative) economy which is too complex for
used by the barter and direct distribution of goods to consumers via a voucher
classified into system. Soviet monetary policy encompasses basic arrangements
noncommunist
iesThe first 6Faiiure of the flow of consumer goods to match the increase in money income due to
delays in completing new factories or to the accumulation of finished goods in factories may cy circulation. also involve bank action. However, prior to the Reform, the failure of financing for a
lanned budget specific project to reach the planned amount would normally lead to interruption of
. constructionor allocations of additional funds from some reserve pool of investment funds 'mu citanges ifl (at the disposal of some ministries) rather than to credit financing.160Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium
(the separation of currency circuits, for example) and longer-
range decisions (such as working capital norms and credit plan-
ning), rather than day-to-day activities designed to influence
aggregate demand, as already discussed in Chapters 3 and 6. It is
thus more appropriate to speak of monetary strategy than of
monetary policy, and assign it the role of an organic component of
the planning process rather than that of an independent tool for
influencing current economic activity. Monetary policy in the
Soviet Union is, in fact, limited to controlling the aggregate
amount of currency(household money), the volume and
structure of credit, and the level of enterprise balances. It plays
hardly any role in setting investment priorities or in achieving
increases in productivity and affecting the transfer of human and
material resources between industries and regions.
Although one can identify at any one time the general objec-
tives of the State Bank's credit and note-issue policies, it is
difficult to tie these separate aspects into something that would
add up to a "socialist monetary policy." Western views on Soviet
monetary policy depend on a number of things: the period consid-
ered; the definition of what constitutes monetary policy (for
instance, whether manipulation of the budget surplus constitutes
monetary policy); whether price setting is considered a "mone-
tary means," as Holzman proposes;7 and whether one believes
that price stability is an absolute priority, or, as Hodgman claims,
that authorities are only concerned with achieving a degree of
price stability consistent with a desired rate and pattern of output
growth.8 Montias holds that the role of the monetary and financial
system is limited to assuring that material plans can be carried out
without financial impediments.9 Most Western economists agree
with Powell that Soviet monetary policy has no quantitative
objectives; at best, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank
can take post-factum actions to correct their collective mis-
takes.'° Others believe with Pickersgill that "an economy in
which goods and services are exchanged for money and in which
p.130,f. 1.
p.108.








































workers are paid in units of generalized power" will have at least
an implicit monetary policy." Ames makes the additional point
that "nonmonetary measures" may and, in fact, frequently are
based on monetary analysis and aim at the preservation of mone-
tary equilibrium, so that the fact that a remedy is "nonmonetary"
does not mean that it has no "monetary" aspects.'2
Neither the degree to which overall targets have been achieved
nor shortcomings in certain areas of the economy and in individ-
ual industries can be traced directly to the financial system in
general or its monetary aspects in particular. Yet the question has
been raised whether monetary policy, although passive, might not
have contributed to achieving the goals set by planners.'3
Soviet monetary policy focuses on the flow of consumer pur-
chasing power rather than on the total stock of money. With
prices set administratively and the scope for fluctuations in cur-
rency turnover minimal, Soviet monetary policy operates, in fact,
on the basis of what Hodgman has called "an inverted equation of
exchange" by adjusting M to T.'4 One problem is to determine in
which way control of money to absorb and sterilize excess pur-
chasing power is shared between the State Bank and the budget.
Maintenance of equilibrium in the consumer market is greatly
facilitated by the physical and operational separation of consumer
money from enterprise money. The proper growth of currency in
circulation is one of the "proportionalities" claimed to be a
keystone of Soviet planning. This increase is determined within
an implicit analytical framework that is not unfamiliar to Western
economists. The rise in consumer disposable income projected
from the planned growth targets for GNP at a planned (normally
unchanged) price, after allowing for projected. voluntary savings,
yields an estimate of the required increase in currency in circula-
tion, assuming stable velocity. If the flow of consumer goods and
services cannot be increased correspondingly, inflationary pres-
sures will develop as currency accumulates in the hands of con-
sumers. If spendable income cannot be reduced sufficiently,
''[138], p. 217.
'2Ames [991, p. 172.
for instance, Wiles [253].
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credit to the economy must be cut,if budget surpluses,
deposits held by enterprises and collective farms, household say-
ings, and such minor potential offsets as profits of the State Bank
cannot absorb the excess currency. It is in this sense that the
"planned" increase in circulation "determines" the volume of
credit, a statement that is frequently found in Soviet literature and
one that, to Western economists, appears to put things upside
down. Constant official emphasis is on limiting credit and main-
mining levels of circulating currency that neither push kolkhoz
market prices far above official food prices nor produce persistent
consumer goods shortages and queueing.
In addition to limiting currency in circulation, the basic objec-
tive of bank policy is to offset any changes in the velocity of
household cash which may result from dishoarding, usually as a
result of precautionary buying in anticipation of shortages.15
When the level and distribution of spending do not conform to the
underlying plans, only minor remedial action can be taken by the
State Bank through administrative improvisation.
If excessive issuance of credit produces redundant balances in
the accounts of the state-owned sector of the economy—in addi-
tion to or instead of an excessive flow of purchasing power to
households—the problem is tackled by administrative interven-
tion, either by transferring cash balances among individual enter-
prises (thus obviating the need to borrow by some of them), or by
speeding up loan collection.
Holzman, who authored the most detailed study of the period
from the start of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 to 1957 credits
improved direct bank controls over aggregate payroll
tures rather than deflationary monetary and fiscal policy for the
considerable easing of inflationary pressures after World War 11.16
Other Western students of the Soviet economy view the post-
World War II decline and ultimate stabilization of prices, accom-
panied by a decline of free-market prices relative to official prices,
as the result of a "fully-administered price decline" rather than a
monetary deflation.
'5Given the low level of financial savings until the middle sixties, surges in the velocity
of currency due to dishoarding or withdrawals from savings accounts have never assumed
large proportions. Concern with variations in velocity and attempts to study its determi-





































War II years in [140]
'81n contrast to C
in a frozen Treasury
SFISCAL POLICY
Budget policy has been a key element in Soviet financial policy.
The various aspects of this policy involve not only decisions
about the level of the budget and the size of planned surpluses,
but also such matters as the use of surpluses as a source of bank
credit, the structure of taxation, virtually compulsory loans (see
below), and the determination of the portion of budget revenue
channeled into capital formation. In view of the central role of the
budget in economic planning and the overall apportionment of
resources between the socialized sector and the consumption
sector, overall fiscal policy has been a more important financial
regulator than monetary policy.'7 Budgetary policy has been used
for basic decisions regarding longer-run periods (normally the
duration of a five-year plan), rather than as an economic steering
mechanism or for "fine tuning" when performance failures occur
or miscalculations become apparent. Its chief characteristic has
been a gradual restructuring of the revenue side. The precise
point at which revenue for the financing of public investment,
general administration, and provision of collective services is
collected is largely a matter of convenience.
Since 1924, when the first steps toward overall financial plan-
ning were taken, the budget has shown a surplus, except for the
war years. The interpretation of budgetary surpluses for individ-
ual years is complicated by a variety of factors, including the
treatment before 1963 of the net increase in savings deposits as a
regular source of revenue and the availability of bank credit to
individual enterprises for discharging their liabilities toward the
budget, including payment of the state's share of profits.
Budgetsurpluses have been an important source of increases in
bank resources. Sterilized cumulative surpluses are more compa-
rable to additions to bank capital than to banking claims.18 In fact,
a very large but unknown part of the liabilities of the State Bank
consists of such Treasury deposits (perhaps 40 percent). Thus, by
systematically building up its deposits at the State Bank the
'7Powell, in Holzman [122], p. 576.Hearrived at a similar conclusion for the pre-Worid
War II years in [140].
'81n contrast to China, the Soviet Union does not specifically neutralize such surpluses
in a frozen Treasury account. See [1231, pp. 138ff.
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Ministry of Finance transfers toit command over a certain margins and th
amount of real resources which, until recently, at least, the Bank rates by indus
has used mainly for making working-capital loans to enterprises, important me
Personal taxes have not played a significant part in the Soviet On balance,
fiscal system since taxation of wage and salary earners was decreasing em
reduced to a nominal level in In recent years, personal tive reductions
taxes have been applied mostly to the private income of state their abolition
employees (such as income from the private practice of doctors the cost of liv in
and lawyers), to individuals producing goods or providing ser- cost increases.
vices outside the socialized sector, and to bachelors and small receipts declin
families. percent in 197
The insignificance of the private sector has kept income taxa- man's view, it'
tion, in contrast to some other socialist countries, from becoming rudimentary fo
a potent means of syphoning off excess purchasing power. Never- The form o
theless, due to the growth of nonwage taxation and the tax base rather than the
itself, the share of revenue raised from this source rose from 5 only marginal
percent in 1940 to over 8.2 percent in 1971. It must be kept in the pattern of
mmd when interpreting this increase that, prior to 1957, compul- Internal loan
sory loan subscriptions at the place of employment were equiva- absorbing exce
lent to withheld payroll taxes. (In fact, government borrowing very much like
from the population during the twenties and thirties comprised a tion goals mci
substantial element of overall financial policy.) real-value gu
The relatively small reliance placed on personal taxes veils the tributing intere
basic fact that a much larger part of the social income than in the (by earmarking
Western countries has been absorbed and disposed of by the of specific maj
budget. For instance, the total tax burden as a percentage of From 1927 t
personal income, which Holzman computed to obtain an estimate help finance vo
of the ex ante inflationary gap, doubled between 1926 and 1936. in fact, as a m
According to Holzman's estimates, the average true rate of taxa- Loans quotas
tion oscillated between 51 and 60 percent in the, 1932—1940 period, places of emplç
and rose further in the years immediately following World War II, year in
reaching a peak of almost 69 percent in 1949.20 obligatory, aith
The two main sources of budgetary receipts, enterprise profits responsibilities
and turnover taxes, have already been discussed in Chapter 5. worker. The
The overall amount of profits is determined by planning of eco- ment loans
nomic performance, including the setting and attainment of profit gradually raised
issues of 1927
'9See Bunnistrov [19]. For the history of personal taxation; see Maryakhin [601. See year in which
also Davies [109] and Zverev [95].
20Holzman[121], Table 53,col.I for the 1926—1936 comparison, and col. HA for the
average rate. 21Liberman [54], p
:1.The Tools 165
margins and the degree of plan fulfillment. The setting of the profit
rates by industry and of turnover taxes on individual products are
important means toward maintaining demand-supply equilibrium.
On balance, while the burden of taxation has remained heavy,
decreasing emphasis has been placed on the turnover tax. Selec-
tive reductions in turnover tax rates for individual products and
their abolition for all services in 1957 have been used to stabilize
the cost of living by offsetting, when deemed desirable, production
cost increases. The share of the turnover tax in total budgetary
receipts declined gradually from 62.7 percent in 1940 to 31.6
percent in 1970 (see Table 8.1), but contrary to Professor Liber-
man's view, it is still far from "becoming more and more a dying,
rudimentary form of taxation."2'
The form of taxation, however, affects mainly the nominal
rather than the real value of incomes. The type of tax will have
only marginal effect on the distribution of the social product and
the pattern of output.
Internal loans have been used from 1922 to 1956, as a means of
absorbing excess purchasing power. Loan drives were conducted
very much like political campaigns. Efforts to achieve subscrip-
tion goals included attractive terms (including various kinds of
real-value guarantees), appeals to the gambling instinct (by dis-
tributing interest in the form of lottery prizes), and to patriotism
(by earmarking the proceeds of individual issues to the financing
of specific major projects of national significance).
From 1927 to 1956, loans were issued annually, ostensibly to
help finance voluntarily industrialization and the war effort, but,
in fact, as a means of implementing a program of forced savings.
Loans quotas were assigned to individual factories and other
places of employment and subscriptions were collected over the
year in installments by payroll deduction. Subscription was quasi-
obligatory, although some allowance was made for the family
responsibilitiesand other particular circumstances of each
worker. The nonvoluntary character of subscriptions to govern-
ment loans was openly recognized. The amount of such loans was
gradually raised from 20 million (new) rubles for each of the three
issues of 1927 to 320 million rubles for a single issue in 1956, the
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TABLE 8.1
The Share of Turnover Taxes in Total Budgetary Receipts,
Selected Years
(billions of rubles)
1940 1950 1960 1970
Total receipts" 16.9 39.2 76.2 156.2
Turnover taxes 10.6 23.6 31.3 49.4
Turnover tax as percentage .
of total 62.7 60.2 41.1 31.6
such "mass loans" was initially ten years, but was lengthened
to twenty in 1936. By the beginning of World War II, bonds for
a total of 5 billion rubles (roughly equivalent to about the same
amount of dollars) had been placed. It is estimated that about 15
percent of the costs of World War II were met by the issuance
of loans. Loans were frequently over-subscribed and issued for
amounts exceeding the target originally set.
At the time these forced loans were discontinued (when interest
payments on outstanding indebtedness rose close to amounts of
new money that could be raised in annual drives), subscriptions
through payroll deductions amounted to 6 to 7 percent of total
wage disbursements and 7.5 percent of total government revenue.
Holders of government bonds suffered losses in principal and
income, beginning in 1930, as a result of several conversions into
longer-term issues, exchange into a consolidated loan at an unfa-
vorable rate at the time of the 1947 ruble succes-
sive lowering of the interest rate originally set. At the time forced
loans were discontinued, payment of interest on the bonds out-
standing was discontinued altogether, transforming them into
interest-free loans. The date of the start of retirement operations,
originally set at 1977, was later advanced to 1974, and is to be
completed in 1990.22
221n addition to compulsory loans, "free" lottery loans with a higher yield (3 instead of 2
percent) have been available on tap since 1947. Since 1958, it is the only security sold. The
amount of such loans outstanding at the end of 1973 was 3.4 billion rubles. For a history of
government borrowing, see Zverev [94] and "Gosudarstwennye Zaimy" in [27].
SOURCE: Computed from [86].
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INCOME POLICY
Income policy includes a number of activities: the control of
wage rates and the aggregate wage bill, the entire area of state-
kolkhoz relations, price setting for goods and services, and deter-
mining the range of free services to be offered.
Most, if not all, of the elements of income policy enter into the
planning process itself. Thus, adjustments in wages and prices,
including those achieved through varying the turnover tax,
together with decisions on changes in production and foreign
trade patterns, reflect basic decisions underlying the five-year
plans. However, adjustments are also made in midstream. They
are usually designed to compensate for deviations in actual results
from plans or to achieve final goals different from original inten-
tions (for instance, to increase the flow of goods to households at
a faster pace than originally planned). Income policy may also
involve, in individual years, increasing income selectively by
raising hourly wages, providing incentive payments and bonuses,
raising stipends and old-age pensions, and extending these to
additional population groups. The most important instance of the
latter was the granting of state pensions to members of collective
farms in 1958.
Continuous efforts are made to keep the compensation of labor,
by far the most important source of consumer purchasing power,
within the limits specified in each enterprise's plan. This control
of the "wages fund" is one of the most important tasks of the
State Bank.23 Failure to control payrolls effectively was the
principal cause of pre-World War II inflation. The improved
control of currency disbursements in the fifties has greatly
reduced inflationary pressure and has made effective price stabili-
zation possible. Since that time, the policy of the authorities to
pass on the benefits of greater productivity through price cuts
rather than by increasing nominal wages has reduced potential
strains on monetary management.
During periods of increasing availability of consumer goods,
real purchasing power of the population has been enlarged by
23See Galimon [281.
S.168 Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium
lowering the turnover tax levied on specific items, by cutting
prices for various categories of consumer goods thus acknowledg-
ing the reductions in production costs of consumer durables, and
by reducing, at times by substantial amounts, the cost of food
items distributed through government and "cooperative" chan-
nels. Subsidies have also been quite widely used and manipulated
when price changes to reflect higher costs appeared undesirable
or when it seemed desirable to sell some food and other items
below cost.
As a means of absorbing excess purchasing power in the house-
hold sector, the Soviet Union has resorted several times to gen-
eral upward price adjustments. Price increases for consumer
goods reduce the real value of cash balances in the hands of the
population while increasing budgetary resources.
Since prices have no direct effects on production, the level of
average factory prices at which output is sold to organizations in
charge of distribution and exports can be set to facilitate adminis-
tration of the economy. Average-cost pricing and average profit-
margin targets are used for this purpose. Some prices are set
to achieve noneconomic goals such as combating alcoholism
or encouraging reading of official publications.
From Inflation to Price Stability
Since the initiation of central planning, the degree of inflationary
pressures acting on the Soviet economy has depended to a large
extent on the skill with which credit, fiscal, price, production, and
inventory policies have been combined and applied to specific
situations, and on how close the prognosis of future developments
has been to actual performance. It is less than obvious what
contribution monetary and credit policy have made to limiting
inflationary pressures during the pre-World War II period. For the
period following the war, an almost complete lack of relevant data
precludes any attempt to quantify their influence.
Since the required monetary statistics, such as currency in
circulation, are not available, the underlying developments must
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From Inflation to Price Stability 169
tion of what indirect measures best reflect inflationary pressures,
opinions among students of the Soviet economy differ. Some
have used official price indexes24 or those constructed by West-
ern experts, while others have relied on evidence of changes in
inventories or savings deposits. Another indirect measure of infla-
tionary pressures is the relationship between budget surpluses
and the expansion of short-term credit. The use of this indicator
is, admittedly, beset by a number of difficulties; for instance,
some of the resources available for lending are derived from
current budgetary appropriations "for the reinforcement of the
resources of the State Bank" rather than from past or current
surpluses. Furthermore, it is not known what part of the increase
in bank credit has resulted in a net increase in currency in
circulation. While some broad assumptions and adjustments can
be made, they do not yield a sufficiently complete and reliable
picture, either for individual years or for selected periods.
PRICE DIFFERENCES IN PARALLEL MARKETS
Still another measure of inflationary pressure may be obtained
by comparing price movements in the parallel markets which
have operated in the Soviet Union. Prior to 1935, when a uniform
price system was established for goods sold by state stores,
several separate markets were operating in addition to the kolk-
hoz market, which has remained by far the most important free
market.
Price levels and movements in these markets differed because
of compartmentalization of supply and differentiated demand
schedules, and because of shifts in these schedules in response to
a variety of factors, including relevant price changes in competing
but different markets.
During the pre-1935 period at least three categories of prices
24For a comprehensive review and critique of Soviet price data, see Jasny's pathbreak-
ing study [124], and Bornstein, "Soviet Price Statistics," in [161], which has an extensive
bibliography. See also Chapman [108], Chapters 2 to 6. A considerable amount of Soviet
price data is summarized in tables and charts in Malafeev [57].Thismonograph contains a
detailed discussion of price history and a surprisingly candid discussion of inflationary
pressures. It also includes a chronology of party and government decisions regarding prices
between 1917 and 1963.
awere relevant for households: (1) ration prices for goods to the
urban population holding ration cards; (2) commercial prices for
goods purchased predominantly by urban households (higher than
ration prices); and (3) free kolkhoz market prices at which house-
holds could buy food. Prices in two special markets completed the
price structure: (4) prices in "cooperative" country stores (the
state network of retail stores in the villages), at which farmers
could buy manufactured goods; and (5) prices (in gold rubles) in
special stores for foreigners and the few Soviet citizens able to
pay in foreign exchange.
The unification of prices and the abolition of rationing at the
end of 1947 left only two price systems—official prices in state
stores, now incorporating the network of cooperative stores, and
the kolkhoz market.25
The failure to drain off excess purchasing power or to increase
the availability of consumer goods and services can be traced by
comparing price movements between these markets. The kolkhoz
market is the only market in which prices are set by producers. It
consists of thousands of stores and stands through which kolk-
hozes and, especially their individual members, sell that part of
their output for which they have freedom of disposition. This
market has been the most important—and visible—indicator of
the intensity of inflationary pressures. When the urban population
cannot satisfy its demand at the state retail stores and seeks to
obtain additional food in the kolkhoz market, a redistribution of
purchasing power takes place, and a restructuring of the demand
for final products results. However, since the propensity of the
kolkhoz farmers to save is apparently higher than that of the
urban population, some reduction of repressed inflation takes
place. On the theory that, for all practical purposes, the kolkhoz
market has been the only, or at least by far the most important,
outlet for such excess demand, the ratio of prices in that market to
those in state stores has been used as a rough indicator of
inflationary pressures (see Table 8.2).26
25Jasny [124].
26While special stores for sales against convertible foreign exchange have continued in
existence in a modified form, they do not play the same role as before World War II and
are, in fact, much more limited to serving tourist and some privileged groups of Soviet
citizens.


























effect of the spillove
for food products.
difference between
valued at official ret
sources valued at su
of course, only a roi'
The formula is given
comparisons as well,
and in fixed prices iii
indexes being comp


















r or to increase



















e World War II and
ed groups øf.Soviet
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PERIODS IN SOVIET MONETARY EXPERIENCE
171
The monetary experience of the Soviet Union can be divided
into five periods:
1. The years of war communism and of the New Economic
Policy prior to the currency reform of 1924.
2. The period between 1924 and the introduction of the credit
reforms of 1930—1932.
3. The period from 1933 up to the Soviet Union's entry into
World War II.
4. World War II and on to the currency conversion at the end
of 1947.
5. From 1948 to the present, which subdivides into a period of
deflation through 1954 and one of considerable price stability
thereafter.
The first two periods have been analyzed by several writers and
have already been dealt with briefly in Chapter 2.27 Since our
focus is on the monetary system that emerged after the 1930- 1932
reforms, only the periods following them will be reviewed here.
The available price data for the entire period 1928—1970 are
summarized in Table 8.2.
1932—1940. The credit reforms of 1930- 1932 created a financial
system which would have made it possible to achieve an equilib-
rium between material and monetary flows. However, the actual
27See Arnold [100], Katzenellenbaum [126], Reddaway [142], and Yurovski [92].
Holzman has developed an indicator of repressed inflation based on an estimate of the
effect of the spillover of the urban population's purchasing power into the kolkhoz market
for food products. This index, which Holzman qualifies as partial, is the ratio of the
difference between actual expenditures in the kolkhoz market and the same expenditures
valued at official retail prices at state stores to the sum of total purchases from these two
sources valued at state store prices. Such a comparison of fixed and free prices for food is,
of course, only a rough indicator of the strength of inflationary pressures (see Table 8.4).
The formula is given in [240], p. 170. Short-term fluctuations, and in some cases longer-run
comparisons as well, are influenced by the changes in each market's share of total food sold
and in fixed prices in the state stores. They are also affected by the construction of the price
indexes being compared and by the limitation of the available estimates of the quantities
sold and prices charged in the thousands of separate outlets operated by individual
kolkhozes, in some cases at a considerable distance from the point of production. Also,
some purchases from kolkhozes and of the private output of their members bypass officially
recognized markets from which price data are collected. A more sophisticated version of
this measure takes into account the share of food purchased in the free market as well as

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.174Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium
of monetary e policies pursued through the successive five-year plans of acceler-
ated industrialization did not bring about price stability. The credit was quit
credit reform hardly slowed the rise in consumer prices, and the Powell foun
flow of purchasing power to consumers continued to exceed the suggests any s
policy, while f available supply of consumer goods at official prices by consider-
able amounts, so that a state of repressed inflation developed, budgetary surpi
Consumer prices rose sharply between 1933 and 1936 (from 545 did, in fact, Pu]
to 94.2, according to the Moorestein-Powell Index), and more ble movements
slowly (by about 10 percent for the entire three-year period) lags of an und
between 1936 and 1939. As Table 8.1 shows, they rose sharply excess monethi
again between 1939 and 1940. and World Wa
The inflation was the joint consequence of a systematic under- output, "monei
allocation of resources to consumer goods production and of a attainment of
wage drift which was an almost unavoidable by-product of the meant to sei'ie,
industrialization policy pursued. The supply situation in this the social prodi.
period was worsened still further by a reduction of food supplies a widening and
resulting from the forced collectivization and related farm poii- among the "re
cies. The vigor of the inflationary pressures is evident (or can be and banking sy
derived) from official statistics, despite their shortcomings, gaps, excess monetal
and inconsistencies 28 The pre-Wor
Control over payrolls was introduced soon after the credit policy of
reform early in 1933, in the form of monthly and quarterly "stan- Indeed, the suc
dard certificates for wages," issued to individual enterprises. To designed to pa
allow for the increase in average skills and to attract workers into rising
the rapidly growing industrial area authorities planned average growth of curre
wage increases of up to 9 percent in some years. Actual annual increased avai
increases, however, were considerably larger, ranging up to 25 doubt, howeve:
percent or more a year. Thus, the "wage drift" alone was typi- start of this pei
cally in excess of the projected overall rate of increase.29 Clearly, befo
Moreover, according to Pickersgill's estimates, the income control system
velocity of currency circulation rose from 5.9 in 1933 to 14.9 in underlying plar
At the same time, neutralization through budget surpluses level (though
reflected in th
1933 to 7.7ii
28Atlas [163],p. 88. claims, apparently on the basis of unpublished data, that in the five
years immediately preceding World War 11(1935—1940) currency circulation was permitted
to increase only in proportion to the availability of consumer goods through trade channels.
He gives a coefficient of correlation of .96 for this period between these two magnitudes.
'[121], pp. 53 an
29See Holzman [121], p. 39, 309—310; and [2401, p. 177.
32[140] pp. 267, 2
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of monetary expansion resulting from issuance of short-term
credit was quite moderate.3'
Powell found that for 1935—1937 available evidence scarcely
suggests any systematic coordination of credit and budgetary
policy, while for the thirties as a whole, the money stock and
budgetary surpluses were negatively correlated. If the authorities
did, in fact, pursue a policy of using surpluses to offset undesira-
ble movements in the money stock, its effects must have involved
lags of an undetermined nature.32 Powell concluded that while
excess monetary demand in the period between the credit reform
and World War II possibly served to assure a maximization of
output, "monetary policy has more frustrated than facilitated the
attainment of those ultimate objectives which the system was
meant to serve,"33 namely, price stability, orderly distribution of
the social product, and growth. It may be added that the burden of
a widening and tightening of financial controls must be counted
among the "real consequences" of the failure of the monetary
and banking system prior to World War II to effectively deal with
excess monetary demand.
The pre-World War II inflation cannot be considered a planned
policy of financing forced industrialization through inflation.
Indeed, the successive plans projected a decline in the price level
designed to pass on to consumers a large part of the benefits of
rising productivity. The first plan (1928—1932) also provided for a
growth of currency circulation (62 percent) slower than that of the
increased availability of consumer goods (80—90 percent); no
doubt, however, a considerable monetary overhang existed at the
start of this period.
Clearly, before World War II there were enough leakages in the
control system and enough weaknesses and uncertainties in the
underlying plans to result in an almost continuous rise in the price
level (though some diminution of inflationary pressuresis
reflected in the sharp drop of Holzman's indicator from 17.3 in
1933 to 7.7 in1940). Actual spending could rise above the
pp. 53and 229.
32[140},pp.267, 296—298.
p.337.34Deficits in the earlier waryearsamounting to a total of 32 biffion rubles were followed
by smallsurplusesin the last two years (1944 and 1945).
"[63], pp. 234, 235, and 407.
176 Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium
amounts planned ex ante primarily because enterprises exceeded
the planned amounts of payrolls, and, to a limited extent, because
consumers activated currency hoards. As a result, a significant
disequilibrium between monetary demand and the available sup-
ply at fixed prices characterized the years between the credit
reform and the Soviet Union's entry into World War II in 1941.
1941—1947. The financing of the Soviet war effort involved
neither large-scale issuance of currency nor borrowing from the
State Bank.34 Prices rose rapidly, particularly during the first
three war years (1941—1943). In July 1943, prices for the main
categories of farm products in the kolkhoz marketwere 18.7 times
their July 1941 level (having reached a peak in April 1943); the
kolkhoz market's share of food sales rose between 1940 and 1945
from 20 to 51 percent, and of all retail sales, from 14 to 46 percent.
According to Malafeev's calculations, the weighted index of
prices of goods sold in the state and kolkhoz market in 1945 was
still 325 percent of the 1940 level, while the index of prices in state
and cooperative stores alone was nearly 2.2timeshigher.35
During World War II, the State Bank continued its usual activi-
ties, which were disrupted in large areas of the national territory
for several years by military operations and by the German
occupation. As in other countries engaged in war, it serviced the
currency needs of the army. Its normal credit activities were
complicated not only by the temporary loss of territory to the
occupying armies of Germany and its allies, but also by the large-
scale evacuation of factories to Siberia, Central Asia, and other
areas removed from the theatre of operations. It is remarkable
that neither the use of Soviet currency by the invading armies
(along with occupation currency issued by them), nor the disloca-
tion of normal economic activity and administrative structure in
occupied areas, nor the subsequent incorporation into the Soviet
Union of large territories on its Western border resulted in mone-
tary chaos.
The war-generated overhang of liquidity consisted essentially
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From Inflation to Price Stability 177
who had been unable to spend their income during the war years
because of the shortage of goods. It was removed by the currency
conversion of 1947 (see Chapter 3).
1948—1972. Following the currency conversion of 1947, which
abolished wartime rationing, the trend in prices was almost con-
tinuously downward until 1954; since then, average consumer
prices have remained about level. The share of the kolkhoz
market in total retail sales (valued in prices actually paid in both
markets) declined from 12.0 percent in 1950 to 4.5 percent in 1960
and 2.8 percent in 1969.36 In the postwar period, the State Bank
has been clearly more effective than before in controlling dis-
bursements from enterprise balances, and spending for unauthor-
ized purposes, particularly for wages, has been significantly
reduced. For instance, any overspending on payrolls is required
to be offset by compensating reductions in aggregate wage pay-
ments by the offending enterprise in the following three to five
months.
The degree to which fiscal policy has contributed to maintaining
a relatively high degree of price stability is not clear. Yet the
contrast between the period before World War II and that follow-
ing the currency conversion of 1947 is striking. In the eleven years
beginning January 1, 1930, the cumulative budget surplus of 26.4
billion rubles (most of which was sterilized in the treasury account
of the State Bank) was little more than half as great as the 50.6
billion ruble increase in short-term loans outstanding. By con-
trast, in the years 1951 through 1956, budget surpluses exceeded
increments in bank loans.37 However, as Holzman points out,
judging from price changes in individual years, over short-run
periods the budget surplus-loan expansion offset mechanism was
no more effective in the fifties than it had been in the thirties.
Fluctuations of consumer goods prices in state stores, in the
kolkhoz market, and in the ratio of the two price indexes since the
end of World War II must be viewed from the perspective of a
huge increase in money income during this period. With the sum
of taxes and other deductions (mainly state loan subscriptions)
36192], 1969,p. 600. Valued in state store prices, the decline was from 11.4 to 3.0 and to
1.8 percent, respectively.
"Powell in Holzman 11221, p. 4. It must be kept in mind that in Soviet budgets the sale
of government bonds is considered a regular source of receipts.178Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium
I F
rising at a more moderate rate than monetary income, total
disposable income in 1970 was more than three times as large as in
1950, according to official data. In spite of a rapid rise in popula-
tion, real 1970 per capita income deflated by official retail prices
was more than four times as large as twenty years earlier (Table —
8.3,last line), since these prices on balance show a decline over
the period. During the same time, the proportion of food pur-
chased in the kolkhoz market, which is not reflected in the official
price index, declined, particularly after 1958, while the percentage
of income saved increased sharply.
The main components of monetary income and their disposal
are summarized in Table 8.3. Gross earnings of wage and salary
workers constitute the bulk of money income. Wage payments to
themembers of kolkhozes and various types of transfer payments 0
(mainly pensions), accounting for more than one-fifth of the total
in 1970 (against 12 percent in 1950), rose even more rapidly. Net 3
incomefrom the sale of farm products by the kolkhozes and their
individual members in 1970 was slightly more than double the
1950 level and a much larger part of income generated in the
kolkhoz sector was distributed in money wages. "Other income," 2
of which military pay is the largest component, declined gradually
in the two decades.
A detailed examination of the Soviet price indexes cannot be a
undertakenhere. Most Western scholars have considerable reser-
vations on many accounts, but are inclined to accept them as
rough approximations reflecting the basic changes over time.
According to the official retail price index38 (Table 8.2, column 4),
the consumer prices remained virtually unchanged during the
sixties, following a sharp decline during the fifties.
The fact that since the end of World War II prices in the
ko!khoz market have continued to exceed food prices at state
stores suggests that available supplies, choice, and quality of food
carried by state stores continue to be deficient. The ratio of the
two price indexes rose sharply between the fourth quarter of 1950
and 1955 (see Table 8.4), and Holzman's indicator of suppressed
38The size of the bias in the available official price indexes is unknown. Thus, during
1969—1970, ceilings were placed on the supposedly free collective farm market prices. At
the same time, there has been evidence in recent years of surreptitious price









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































180Stabilization Policy and Monetary Equilibrium Fa
TABLE 8.4 of the four-yea
Indicators of Inflationary Pressures, Selected tuated little the
Years, 1940—1971 The much in
ing the sixties
I. Ratio of Collective Farm Market to State Retail Prices for Food skillful coordir
1940 Annual average 1.78 1955 Four quarters 1.74 possible to ach
1945 Annual average 5.33 1955 Annual average 1.75
l947Fourquarters 2.98 l960Annualaverage 1.35 Since a consid
1950 Four quarters 1.25 1964 Annual average 1.63 the war had be
II. Holzman's Indicatora an initial
193217•1b 19502.5 19544.2
193317.3 19513.4 19554.1 in the
19407.7 19524.8 19562.8 official and fre
19533.5 abolition of foc
III. Partial Indicator of Suppressed Inflation complete unifi
(1955 =100)
195039 196030 196624 and salary ean




195932 196528 197123 Fa
SOURCES: For I, 1940—1955, see Holzman [240], pp. 168—170; for
1955—1964, see Bronson and Severin in[153), p.514, revised and updated The Soviet Ui
by the authors. For II, including formula for the indicator, see Holzman that have crea
[240], pp. 168—170. For III, see Bronson and Severin, as above. socialist count
a1950—1956:fourth quarter only.
Probably understated; see [133], p. 258. available to Co
contributions
inflation rose from 2.5 to 4.1. Bronson and Severin,39 who have sive degree of
recomputed Holzman's indicator of suppressed inflation on the have clearly 1
basis of more recent data and carried it forward to 1971, found an Closer adhere
even greater rise between 1950 and 1955 (based on annual aver- pline") by en
ages). The decline in the overall price level prior to 1955 is rency flows go
explainable largely by a reduction in state store prices, while the bility of
subsequent decline through 1960 was due to a decline in the share the forced pla
of the higher-priced kolkhoz market in total food sales. The index to attract a lar
of repressed inflation rose again moderately and irregularly also helped to
between 1960 and 1964, reflecting rising kolkhoz market prices, ble limits. 3
with disposable money income up by nearly 30 percent at the end
I excessiveam
39David W. Bronson and B. Severin, "Recent Trends in Consumption and Disposable 4°Unpublished e
Income in the in [153], p. 500. 1 am indebted to D. Bronson for supplying the 41See, for install

















40], pp. 168—170; for







ior to 1955 is
ices, while the




cent at the endS
tion and Disposable
a for supplying the
of the four-year period,40 but it declined through 1966 and fluc-
tuated little thereafter.
The much improved post-World War H price experience, dur-
ing the sixties in particular, was due, at least in part, to a more
skillful coordination of fiscal and bank policy which made it
possible to achieve a declining and eventually stable price level.
Since a considerable part of the typical worker's budget during
the war had been spent on food purchased at free market prices,
an initial upward adjustment of food prices at state stores was
required in the first postwar years to reduce the spread between
official and free market ("commercial") prices in order to make
abolition of food rationing feasible. This, however, did not bring a
complete unification of the price system. The real income of wage
and salary earners was fairly rapidly reestablished by subsequent
price reductions, mainly for manufactured products.
Factors Contributing to Price Stability
The Soviet Union has managed to avoid the inflationary crises
that have created considerable difficulties in many of the other
socialist countries4' and, in the sixties, was able to widen options
available to consumers. While it is difficult to assess the relative
contributions of the main financial tools in achieving the impres-
sive degree of price stability prevailing in the sixties, the following
have clearly been the most important contributing factors.1.
• Closer adherence to financial plans (improved "financial disci-
pline") by enterprises. 2. A more successful balancing of cur-
rency flows going to the population vis-á-vis the increased availa-
bility of consumer goods. Since the discontinuance after 1957 of
•the forced placement of government bonds, the authorities' ability
to attract a large volume of voluntary deposits into savings banks
also helped to keep the growth of effective demand within desira-
ble limits. 3. Greater efficiency and promptness in absorbing
excessive amounts of currency paid out, mainly by manipulation
40Unpublished estimates by D. Bronson.
4tSee, for instance, Podoiski [139] and the articles on Poland by Brzeski and by Montias
in Grossman [118]. On China, see Hsiao [123].
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I
ofadministered prices and of turnover taxes. 4. The more efficient I
controlof wages, and more importantly, greater success of the
State Bank in controlling actual withdrawals of currency for
payrolls.
Many unanswered questions remain, however. Did the system The F
offer much more scope for monetary and credit policy beyond the
role it actually played? No doubt from the thirties to the mid-
sixties the system by and large fitted the requirements of the
centrally directed economy. But was there room, without under-
mining its principal characteristics, for developing a market sector
or para-market mechanisms through which production. and distri-
bution of certain consumer goods and services would be guided
by monetary demand and prices would reflect the play of supply ALMOST ten
and demand? Could a wider application of monetary tools and contribution th
processes have achieved more efficient resource use within the ciency of the S
framework of planners' intentions? Could the operational aspects still
of the monobank have been improved significantly without under- of the Reform,
mining the basic premises of a banking system whose main func- economic grow
tion was to make real flows meet plan objectives, not to influence significant aspe
them? Could credit financing of investment, even along the mod- in consumer
est lines of the 1965 Reform, have contributed to reducing corn- the influence o
pletion delays and thus diminish the volume of real resources not those that are,
contributing to current output? These questions with regard to the several years
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